The Pitfalls of China’s Top-Level Engagement in the Gulf
GULF INTERNATIONAL FORUM
In the wake of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, there have been some fears in the U.S. security establishment that the U.S. might cede influence in the Middle East to China. For some, this must be addressed if President Joe Biden is to “pivot” and transfer U.S. assets to East Asia.
This view is far too simplistic and overlooks China’s present engagement with the Middle East. Moreover, it ignores how its limited involvement with regional societies might undermine any push for greater regional influence. Indeed, should Beijing persist in its current approach, it risks ending up on the wrong side, especially if current leaderships are replaced.
Premature Worries of Chinese Primacy
To be sure, China’s presence in the Middle East has grown in recent decades. However, those connections remain primarily economic, expanding from trade in energy products to investment in other sectors, including large-scale infrastructure projects associated with its Belt and Road Initiative.
Chinese engagement with the Gulf has also become more deliberate, leading to closer ties and cooperation with crucial governments in the region. Indeed, Beijing has established comprehensive strategic partnerships—the highest form of engagement it can offer—with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran.
